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Abstract 
 
The determinants of public spending composition have been studied from three broad 
perspectives in the scholarly literature: functional economic pressures, institutional constraints 
and party-political determinants. This paper engages with the third perspective by placing 
intra-governmental dynamics in the center of the analysis. Building on the portfolio allocation 
approach in the coalition formation literature and the common pool perspective in public 
budgeting, I argue that spending ministers with party-political backing from the Finance 
Minister or the Prime Minister are in a privileged positon to obtain extra funding for their 
policy jurisdictions compared to their colleagues without such support or without any partisan 
affiliation (non-partisan ministers). I test these propositions via a system of equations on six 
spending categories using seemingly unrelated regressions on a panel of 32 parliamentary 
democracies over two decades and offer largely supportive empirical evidence. With the 
exception of education, I provide evidence that budget shares accruing to key spending 
departments reflect this party-political logic of spending outcomes. In addition to the 
econometric results, I also illustrate the impact of ministerial alignment by short qualitative 
accounts from selected country cases. 
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With a Little Help from My Friends:  
Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending 
Composition in Parliamentary Democracies 
  
 
Introduction 
If the study of politics is best conceptualized by the time-tested Lasswellian 
(1936) catchphrase of “who gets what, when and how”, investigating the 
determinants of public spending composition should be one of the most 
relevant avenues of inquiry for political science scholarship. Since the birth of 
the modern “tax state” and its subsequent transformation into the “debt state” 
(Streeck 2014), an increasing amount of fiscal resources have been channeled 
from current and future taxpayers to recipients of welfare programs and 
beneficiaries of public goods and services. In most advanced capitalist 
democracies, around half of GDP passes through government coffers every 
year. Decisions on who gets what share of this pie and who gets favored at the 
expense of whom have great potentials to fuel new political conflicts, 
restructure existing ones and ultimately decide the electoral fate of ministers, 
parties and governments responsible for the spending mix. 
Yet, despite the large body of literature addressing this issue, we lack a 
coherent account of the main drivers of spending shares across different 
budgetary categories. This paper aims to take an important step in that 
direction by highlighting the role of political agency in the budget process. By 
building on two influential literatures on intra-governmental dynamics – the 
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portfolio allocation model (Laver and Shepsle 1990) and the common pool 
resource approach (von Hagen and Harden 1995), respectively – I highlight the 
crucial role of party-political alignment between governmental actors as an 
important predictor of spending composition in parliamentary democracies. 
The main argument I put forward and test in a panel of 32 parliamentary 
democracies over 20 years is that spending ministers with the same party-
political background as the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister are 
systematically privileged in the annual allocation of budgetary resources 
compared to ministers delegated by coalition partners and their non-partisan 
colleagues. 
This government-centered explanation on spending outcomes does not sit in 
an unchartered territory, however. The extant literature on public spending 
composition that I review in the next section has provided a rich empirical 
arsenal to build on. The economic literature has made important contributions 
by highlighting some of the structural conditions – globalization, overall fiscal 
constraints, levels of economic development, demography etc. – that create 
various sources of social demands on different types of budgetary resources.  
The institutional perspective, by contrast, has zoomed in on the constitutional 
and legislative environment that shapes the incentives and strategic flexibility 
of the main political players to steer spending composition towards their 
political objectives. Thirdly, an important group of political accounts has 
stressed the role of ideology of collective actors as well as the personal 
backgrounds of the political elites as predictors of budget composition.  
In this paper I shall not aim to provide a definitive confirmation of these 
findings, nor shall I aim to call their validity into question. Instead, I argue that 
the party-political aspect of intra-governmental dynamics merits further 
analysis because of two important shortcomings of the existing literature. First, 
much of the evidence provided is concerned with slowly-changing 
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phenomena, such as functional economic pressures and macro-political 
institutions. Their explanatory power may be strong in the long run, but they 
are hard to square with some of the short-term swings that one can observe in 
spending composition over the timeframe that this paper addresses (1995-
2015)1. Second, much of the empirical literature all too often conceptualizes 
governments as monolithic benevolent planners that somewhat 
mechanistically respond to the underlying demands of their constituencies 
without taking stock of other, self-serving motives that may shape their 
behavior. This latter point is of course not entirely new in the long history of 
political thought; the origins of the public choice school in the context of 
budgeting (Niskanen 1971, Tullock et al 2002) lie in this very premise. 
However, an explicit incorporation of the different and often conflicting 
incentives driving ministers’ spending preferences offers valuable 
contributions to our understanding of the political economy of budgeting. 
Figure 1 offers a quick visual summary of our main explanandum. The plots 
provide a visual snapshot of country-specific spending shares of 6 COFOG2 
categories over our study period. The black circles mark the country-specific 
minima and maxima while the red squares show the country averages. The 
vertical blue line cutting across the graphs marks the sample average. All data 
are expressed in % of overall general government spending. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 1 The two exceptions are Finland and Switzerland where data is available from 1990 onwards. 2 The Classification of Functions of Government developed by the United Nations (UN, 1999) classifies government spending into 10 functional categories: general public services, defence, public law and order, economic affairs, environmental protection, housing, health, recreation and culture, education, and social protection.  
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Figure 1. Spending shares of 6 COFOG categories in 32 countries between 1995 and 2015 (% of total government spending) 
   
   Source: OECD, Eurostat, own calculations.  
In any given spending category, the width of country-specific ranges reveals 
that significant within-country variation occurred over a relatively limited 
time-span of two decades. Whether one looks at the range of spending on 
public order and safety in Latvia, economic services in the Czech Republic or 
healthcare in Ireland, it is implausible to attribute these swings to changes in 
the structural economic conditions or macro-political institutions. The cross-
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country patterns also seem hard to reconcile with some of the existing accounts, 
especially when one looks at some selected pairwise comparisons. In other 
words, comparing country-specific averages between countries with similar 
institutional structures (forms of government, electoral and party systems, 
degree of federalism, welfare and production regimes etc.) leaves some of the 
large differences unexplained. For instance, how does one account for the 
relatively large difference in healthcare spending between Latvia and 
Lithuania, or the difference between spending on economic affairs between 
Denmark and Finland when these country-pairs largely resemble in their 
institutional make-up and the prevailing economic conditions and structures? 
These over-time and cross-country differences highlight the need to turn to 
short-term governmental dynamics for an answer. 
After outlining the three clusters of the relevant empirical literature in greater 
detail in the next section, I proceed to inquire what the portfolio allocation and 
the common pool resource literature can contribute to our conceptualization of 
public spending composition in section III. Section IV outlines my data and my 
empirical strategy, Section V presents the main empirical findings, 
complemented by robustness checks and extensions in Section VI. Section VII 
concludes. 
 
Structure, institutions or agency? Drivers of public 
spending composition 
The role of structural conditions and constraints prevailing in (post)-industrial 
societies has long been a prime candidate in accounting for the growth of the 
public sector (Swank 1988, Adsera and Boix 2002). Only relatively recently did 
the scholarly community turn from the dynamics of overall spending to its 
functional purposes. For instance, among the most commonly cited reasons for 
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the expansion of government, Wagner’s law3 has provided a fairly accurate 
prediction on how economic development leads to the growth of government 
but said little about how the increased fiscal resources would be spent. 
Likewise, Niskanen’s budget maximizing model (1971) has served as an 
important reference point for conservative critics of government growth but it 
said little about why certain ministries or agencies would be privileged in the 
allocation of annual government funds at the expense of others. 
Over recent decades, a fertile scholarship emerged that related some of the 
structural conditions to public spending composition. Unsurprisingly, 
globalization stood out as one of the most popular narratives in the broader 
story.  Either via FDI penetration (Gemmel et al 2008), external debt stocks 
(Mahdavi 2004) or more generic metrics of trade and financial openness 
(Dreher et al 2006; Shelton et al 2007), the degree of embeddedness in the 
international economy has been linked to variation in the share of public 
resources allocated between productivity-oriented and other forms of 
spending (e.g. social protection). Likewise, overall fiscal constraints have been 
highlighted as an additional structural condition determining the spending 
mix). Mirroring the effects imposed by globalization, periods of fiscal 
consolidation also exert differential pressures on productive vs. non-
productive budgetary items as evidenced by the relatively higher share of 
social spending that is cut under heavy fiscal constraints (Casto 2017 ; Sanz 
2011). In addition to these contributions studying the overall spending mix, 
other contributions have lighted the share of particular spending items as a 
function of structural conditions, such as the rise in pension- and social 
spending in response to demographic changes (Sanz and Velasquez 2007), the 
effect of urbanization on environmental spending (Aghte et al 1996) and the 
                                                 
 3 See Durevall and Henrekson (2011) for its critical reappraisal in an empirical setting 
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link between crime and government spending on education (Rivera and 
Zarate-Tenorio 2016)  
From a political science perspective, however, it would be rather naïve to 
presume that functional pressures automatically translate into an optimal 
change in the spending mix, as if driven by the invisible hand of social demand 
and political supply. Such critique of structural determinism is widely 
recognized by institutionalist scholars who see macro-political institutions both 
as constraints and as shapers of incentives of governmental actors. From the 
former perspective, Tsebelis and Chang (2004) use the constellation veto 
players as well as the ideological distance between them to predict changes in 
budget composition in a multidimensional space. Another example of the view 
of institutions as constraints is offered by the vast literature on fiscal rules. Tsai 
(2014), for instance shows that carryover rules in American states condition the 
changes in states’ budget composition in the run-up to gubernatorial elections.  
Alternatively, institutions can be conceptualized as strategic opportunities 
shaping the incentive of governmental actors to further their political 
objectives. One prominent contribution from this angle is Milesi-Ferretti et al’s 
seminal article (2002) that distinguishes between geographically targetable 
spending (such as government purchases of goods and services) and broad-
based transfers and argues that electoral systems condition which types of 
spending would be preferred by re-election seeking incumbents. In a similar 
spirit, Breunig and Busemeyer (2012) distinguish between discretionary and 
entitlement spending and show how the two types of spending categories are 
affected differently in times of austerity in different electoral systems. 
Despite these important findings, by their very nature macro-political 
institutions change very rarely and hence their explanatory power in 
accounting for large within country changes demonstrated earlier is inherently 
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limited. This consideration has prompted a group of scholars to zoom in on the 
role of government itself, as distinct from state structures discussed above, for 
an answer. After all, elections and government changes bring a new set of 
players to decision-making positions with an opportunity to act upon their first 
preferences subject to institutional constraints. The role of government 
ideology has accordingly been shown to impact on different budgetary 
categories. Potrafke (2011) shows that government ideology has a weak 
influence on budget composition with left-wing governments more likely to 
channel resources to general public services and education. When ideology, 
strictly understood, is replaced in the empirical studies by the attention that 
parties devote to certain budgetary items in their manifestos, the effects are 
considerably stronger. In this vain, Breunig (2011) demonstrates that attention 
shifts lead to large changes in budget composition whereas Brauninger (2005) 
shows that the relative salience of issues in parties’ manifestos is a strong 
predictor of the relative share of social and economic types of budget outlays. 
By focusing on spending on public order and safety policies (police forces, 
prisons etc.), Wenzelburger (2015) also finds a strong influence of government 
ideology, as measured by parties’ manifestos, on budget outcomes. 
In these accounts, ideology has been used to describe collective political actors 
with governments and political parties in the center-stage.  However, certain 
individuals at the top echelons of the decision-making hierarchy may have an 
independent influence over budget outcomes, on top of what their parties’ 
preferences may normally dictate. On a general level, Brender and Drazen 
(2013) show that leadership changes (replacement of prime ministers in 
parliamentary and presidents in presidential systems) lead to significant 
changes in budget composition. With a narrower focus on certain budget items, 
Hayo and Neumeier (2012) emphasizes the role of prime ministers’ 
professional and personal background in the context of the German Landers: 
Abel Bojar 
 9 
those from lower socioeconomic status tend to privilege spending types that 
have an equalizing effect, namely healthcare and social protection. If the 
personal characteristics of political leaders seem to matter for budgetary 
outcomes, a natural extension of the analytical enquiry is from the top level to 
the lower echelons of policy-making.  
In fact, a related body of literature has studied the role of individual spending 
ministers in cabinet formation and policy output. The idea that heading 
spending ministries is a key objective of office-seeking political parties has a 
clear intuitive appeal. Empirically, one of the most robust relationships in 
political science that lays a well-deserved claim on its status implied by its 
name is Gamson’s law (Browne and Franklin 1973): parties tend to occupy a 
share of ministerial portfolios in direct proportion to their seat shares (and in 
PR systems to their electoral strength) in parliament. It is also fairly well 
established that parties also place a great emphasis on the type of portfolios 
they bargain for at the stage of coalition formation (Back et al 2011, Warwick 
and Druckman 2006): they are more likely to occupy ministries that they 
emphasize in their election manifestos or reveal to prefer via expert interviews 
(see also Raabe and Linhart 2014 for salience measures of ministerial portfolios 
in the German context).  
Though the extent to which these ministers enjoy autonomous policy-making 
powers against the various levers of coalition partners has been subject to a 
long-standing debate (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996; Warwick 1999; Dunleavy 
and Bastow 2001; Carroll and Cox 2012; Thies 2001), there is a growing body of 
literature that examines the ministerial impact on policy output.  For instance, 
Martin and Vanberg (2014) analyze the amendments to proposed bills and 
show that their final version reflects coalition compromises. Gianetti and Laver 
(2005) focus on cabinet ministers’ parliamentary speeches during the Prodi 
government in Italy over the period of 1996-1997 and finds that they are strong 
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predictors of departments’ spending allocations. Alexiadou (2015) in turn 
emphasizes the role of ministers’ personal background and empirically shows 
that they are related to welfare policy output under their jurisdictions. In 
particular, the author’s distinction between partisan heavyweights, loyalists 
and ideologues serves to illuminate the crucial role of ministers’ party-political 
position in the cabinet in predicting policy outcomes. 
Of the multiplicity of factors that determine spending ministers’ policy 
leverage, a shared view in the coalition literature concerns the relative 
bargaining power between coalition partners. Though cabinets in 
parliamentary systems vary a lot on the collegial-hierarchical spectrum of 
policy-making (Alesina and Perotti 1999), two key players are universally 
viewed as first among equals. Of particular importance as the leading voice of 
formateur parties in coalitions, the Prime Minister has special agenda setting 
powers in determining spending priorities at the time of coalition formation 
and in response to new problem pressures that arise from year to year. While 
she is politically accountable to all constituencies that benefit from spending 
programs, the Prime Minister also has partisan goals in mind when navigating 
the trade-off between spending demands under hard budget constraints. When 
having to choose between demands by a spending minister delegated by a 
coalition partner and those made by a partisan colleague, she is likely to favour 
the latter as it confers both personal (as the Prime Minister ultimately 
responsible for all governmental decisions) and partisan (typically as head of 
her party eyeing for the next elections) rewards on her.  While bowing to 
demands of a minister delegated by a different party is often necessary to 
maintain coalition cohesion, it carries the risk of allowing a potential partisan 
rival to claim credit for the extra fiscal resources accruing to her department. 
The implication for budget allocation is clear: spending ministers delegated by 
the senior coalition party headed by the PM have, ceteris paribus, a head-start 
Abel Bojar 
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when it comes to budget appropriations vis a vis their non-partisan cabinet 
colleagues. 
In addition to the Prime Minister, an equally influential player in the budget 
process is the Minister of Finance (Hallerberg et al 2009; Jochimsen and 
Thomasius 2014). Typically conceptualizing the Finance Minister as the 
guardian of budget discipline whose primary objective is to constrain the 
spending demands of his cabinet colleagues, another influential body of 
literature has modelled the total budget as an outcome of a complex interaction 
between spending ministries and the Minister of Finance who bargain over a 
common pool of fiscal resources (Velasco 2000; von Hagen and Harden 1995).4 
In the simplest formulation of this model, each player reaps the full benefits of 
constituency-specific spending but bears only a fraction 1/N of the costs 
implied by the extra tax and/or debt burden that is spread over the whole 
population, where N is the number of relevant players. The more numerous 
the players are, the weaker is the position of the Finance Minister to stand up 
against such spending demands unless aided by a set of budgetary institutions 
created as a counterweight to these pernicious dynamics (Hallerberg et al 2009; 
Poterba and Von Hagen 1999). 
For the purposes of drawing predictions for budget composition, it is crucial to 
disentangle the specific nature of N in the common pool perspective. In a 
partisan-free setting, it is the size of the cabinet that it is mostly relevant: the 
larger (the more fragmented) the cabinet is, the more severe the spending 
pressure becomes leading to larger total outlays (Perotti and Kontpoulous 2002; 
Schaltegger and Feld 2009). More realistically, however, budget negotiation 
takes place in a partisan setting. In addition to the intrinsic benefit that greater 
                                                 
 4 For an extensive review of the common pool approach, see also Raudla (2010). 
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fiscal resources bring in the form of pork barrel and patronage opportunities as 
well as personal prestige (Niskanen 1971; Raabe and Linhart 2014), participants 
at budget negotiation are also likely to have partisan motives in mind with 
crucial implications for the role of the Finance Minister. In particular, the 
conflictual relationship that characterizes the link between the Finance 
Minister, responsible for budget discipline, and spending ministers who fail to 
internalize the costs of excessive spending and thus push for ever greater 
funding for their departments, is expected to depend on their party-political 
background. If the players are conceptualized as parties (Bawn and Rosenbluth 
2006; Wehner 2010) rather than individual ministers, the calculus of the Finance 
Minister is altered. Her motives to rein in department-specific spending are 
now tampered by her partisan goals to channel higher spending shares to their 
co-partisan colleagues at the expense of coalition partners. Tentative evidence 
for this logic is provided by Herzog and Mikhaylov (2014) who show that 
ministers’ proximity to the finance minister, as measured by the content of their 
contributions in budget debates, appears as a strong predictor of their 
departments’ budget allocations in the Irish context. 
In essence, while the coalition formation literature underlines the role of 
formateur parties, and therefore the Prime Minister as the key actor in 
constraining department-specific incentives of spending ministers for higher 
spending, the common pool perspective highlights the Finance Minister as the 
guardian of budget discipline and as the key to department-specific spending 
constraints. Crucially, one can infer from both perspectives that shared party-
political background is a crucial mediating factor in the budgeting calculus by 
aligning incentives between the key players on the one hand and the spending 
ministers, on the other for higher budget shares at the expense of ministries led 
by coalition partners or non-partisan colleagues.  
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A reasonable objection to this reasoning at this point concerns the role of 
procedural budgetary institutions (Hallerberg et al 2009: 2), fiscal rules (Poterba 
1996; Rose 2006) and coalition agreements (Torbjorn et al 2005; Indriðason and 
Kristinsson 2013; Back et al 2017) that constrain the spending power of 
individual ministers as well as the agenda setting and oversight powers of the 
two key players – the Prime Minister and the Finance Minister – identified 
above.  We contend, however, that given these institutional constraints, the 
party-political alignment between the key players continues to matter on the 
margin. For instance, even if a constitutionally mandated fiscal rule sets a 
ceiling on the size of the overall budget, the spending shares accruing to the 
specific departments, which is the focus of this paper, is expected to depend on 
partisan alignment patterns. In other words, the logic of ministerial alignment 
aligned above is largely independent of overall fiscal constraints. Whether co-
partisan colleagues receive more funds because the key players are more likely 
to acquiesce to budgetary overruns (higher deficits) or because they find it 
more palatable to shift resources towards their co-partisans’ departments at the 
expense of others, the overall argument remains intact: on the margin, co-
partisan ministers are better placed to extract more resources from their two 
key leading figures in the cabinet. 
Likewise, even if coalition parties commit to specific spending priorities in their 
coalition agreements, which ministers get a better deal from the bargain and 
who is likely to get the upper hand with year-to-year corrections to the fiscal 
path in subsequent budgetary years is expected to be a function of party-
political alignment.  For instance, while the overall spending-allocations over 
the governments-cycle may be fixed in the initial agreement, the Prime Minister 
and the Finance Minister have a degree of discretion on how they respond to 
fiscal shocks over the cycle. Which ministers get sheltered from an unforeseen 
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fiscal squeeze, for instance, is likely to depend on their party-political 
alignment following the logic outlined above. 
This paper thus focuses on these party-political alignment patterns between 
spending ministers on the one hand and the two key players on the other hand 
and proceeds to test two empirical hypotheses separately:  
H1: Party-political alignment between the Prime Minister and a Spending Minister 
increases the budget share accruing to the Spending Minister’s department. 
H2: Party-political alignment between the Finance Minister and a Spending Minister 
increases the budget share accruing to the Spending Minister’s department. 
 
Data, measurement, estimation 
This paper tests the two hypotheses in a sample of 32 parliamentary 
democracies over the period of 1995-2015 (see Appendix for details). I restrict 
the sample to parliamentary systems because the constellation of actors under 
division of powers in presidential regimes implies a fundamentally different – 
and somewhat more complex – sort of political logic behind budgetary 
allocations. The temporal dimension is driven by data limitations imposed by 
functional classification of government spending. The current version of 
COFOG has been derived by the UN’s statistical division from the system of 
national accounts (OECD 2011) and is available from OECD and EU member 
states (OECD 2017; Eurostat 2017). I focus on the 6 COFOG categories that are 
numerically important (make up more than 3% of total spending on average) 
and can be clearly matched with a spending ministry with the relevant policy 
jurisdiction. The 6 categories with the relevant ministries are: defence (minister 
of defence), public order and safety (minister of the interior), economic affairs 
(minister of the economy), education (minister of education), health (minister of 
Abel Bojar 
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health) and social protection (minister of welfare/social affairs). The party-political 
background of ministers comes from an online database compiled by Lars 
Sonntag5 which I cross-checked with some of the cabinets’ Wikipedia pages for 
reliability. 
For each budgetary item, I create a department-specific categorical variable that 
takes on the following values: 0, when the departmental minister has no party-
political alignment with neither the prime minister nor the finance minister; 1, 
when the departmental minister is aligned with the prime minister but not with 
the finance minister; 2, when the departmental minister is aligned with the 
finance minister but not the prime minister; 3, when the departmental minister 
is aligned both with the finance minister and the prime minister; 4, when the 
departmental minister is non-partisan; 5, in the rare cases (except for the 
economics ministry) when no departmental portfolio existed in a given 
country-year. In the empirical models discussed below, I introduce this 
variable via a set of dummies for each alignment-type by leaving the non-
aligned setting as the reference category (0). The frequency distribution of 
alignment-types is shown on Table A2 in the Appendix. 
The dependent variable of the study is the budgetary share of the respective 
COFOG categories. All shares are expressed as a % of total general government 
spending as our primary interest is how resources are allocated subject to a 
budget constraint, a reasonable approximation for a period of general scarcity 
in fiscal resources. In other words, we want to measure spending shares in a 
way that directly takes into account the trade-off between them, i.e. their zero-
sum nature. 
                                                 
 5 See http://www.kolumbus.fi/taglarsson/dokumentit/governm2.htm [accessed 15 April 2018]. 
Ministerial Alignment and Public Spending 
 
 16 
The empirical models control for a number of variables deemed relevant by the 
empirical literature on budget composition. Following the structure of the 
literature overview, I divide up these controls into three clusters: structural, 
institutional and political. In particular, I use controls that have either been 
singled out by the literature as relevant for the entire budget composition or 
can be directly related to some of the particular budgetary categories by 
theoretical considerations. For instance, while a measure for fiscal constraint 
and globalization included for all equations, a demographic variable is only 
introduced for healthcare, social protection and education. 
Table 1.  Summary of control variables in the empirical models 
Spending Share Variable Measure Source 
All models Growth Structural deficit Debt GDP per capita Trade openness Gallagher index of disproportionality Election year 
(Annual growth, %) % of potential GDP % of GDP Thousand USD (Export+import)/GDP Index score  Dummy variable 
OECD, Eurostat OECD, Eurostat OECD, Eurostat World Bank World Bank Democracy Barometer Parlgov database 
Defence Military personnel 
Minister’s party’s ideology % of population  Dummy for left-of center World Bank Parlgov database 
Public order and safety Urban population Riots 
Minister’s party’s ideology % of population in cities Dummy for large riots Dummy for left-of center World Bank Democracy Barometer Parlgov database 
Economic affairs Urban population 
Minister’s party’s ideology % of total population Dummy for left-of center World Bank Parlgov database 
Education Dependency ratio (young) 
Minister’s party’s ideology Young/working-age   Dummy for left-of center World Bank Parlgov database 
Healthcare Dependency ratio (old) Life expectation 
Minister’s party’s ideology Old/working-age  Years Dummy for left-of center World Bank World Bank Parlgov database 
Social protection Dependency ratio (old) Unemployment 
Minister’s party’s ideology Old/working-age  % of labour force Dummy for left-of center World Bank IMF Parlgov database 
 
 
Table 1 above summarizes the controls, together with their source, that enter 
the spending share-specific models. Apart from the overall criteria outlined 
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above, I aimed to prioritize variables that can be thought of as exogeneous 
structural or institutional drivers of (or constraints over) the respective 
spending shares. Of course, exogeneity, in a strict sense can’t always be 
guaranteed. The size of the military, for instance, is not just a demand-side 
driver of defence spending but is also a function of the allocated funds for the 
military. I thus aimed for a practical compromise between minimizing type 1 
and type 2 errors: not omitting some of the most relevant exogenous drivers 
and not including too many that may cause endogeneity bias in our main 
estimates of interest. 
Since I estimate a system of equations with potentially contemporaneously 
correlated errors6, I follow the budget composition literature (see Dreher et al 
2006 and Breunig and Busemeyer 2012 for examples) and fit seemingly 
unrelated regressions (SUR) on the data (Zellner 1962). SUR has the advantage 
over conventional panel techniques that it increases the efficiency of the 
estimates when the residuals from the different equations are correlated and a 
different set of regressors enter as explanatory variables in the different 
equations. Taking into account country-heterogeneity that we are unable to 
explicitly model and may introduce severe bias in our estimates in case of 
correlation between the country-specific errors and the regressors, I also 
include a set of country dummies. I thus essentially model the impact of 
ministerial alignment on the deviation of the different spending shares from 
their country-specific means. As a robustness check I provide results by 
estimating the spending shares separately via fixed-effects OLS with panel 
corrected standard-errors (Beck and Katz 1995). 
                                                 
 6 In fact, since the spending shares are expressed as a % of the total budgt, any omitted that shows up in the error term in one equation variable – for instance, shocks affecting only one of the  spending items - is likely to be negatively related to the error term in another equation. 
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The estimated system of equations can be parametrically described as follows: 
𝑆𝑗𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑡 ∗  𝐶𝑗𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑗𝑖   +  𝜀𝑗𝑖 𝑡 
The dependent variable S stands for the spending share in budgetary category 
j, in country i at time t, 𝛼𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the regression intercept,  𝑋𝑗𝑖𝑡  is the main 
independent variable (the categorical variable for different constellations of 
ministerial alignment), 𝐶𝑗𝑖𝑡 is a vector of control variables, 𝛾𝑗𝑖  are n-1 country 
dummies, 𝜀𝑗𝑖 𝑡 are the residuals and 𝛽𝑗𝑖𝑡 and 𝛾𝑗𝑖𝑡 are a set of coefficients to be 
estimated. 
 
Results: the impact of ministerial alignment on budget 
composition 
As a first test of the empirical plausibility of the theories, I provide descriptive 
summary statistics of budget shares under different constellations of 
ministerial alignment. Since the econometric tests model the country means by 
country-specific fixed effects, the spending shares shown on Figure 2 below are 
demeaned averages, i.e. deviations from the country-specific means. 
Though the patterns are somewhat mixed and differ greatly between the 
different spending shares, there are some interesting commonalities to be 
observed. For instance, apart from the defence budget, periods of non-
alignment tend to be associated with below-average department-specific 
spending shares. The reverse seems to be true for most alignment types. 
Although to varying degrees and with some exceptions, periods of ministerial 
alignment with the Prime Minister, Finance Minister or both tend to be 
associated with above average spending shares. Spending shares under non-
partisan spending ministers are mixed; especially the spending share of social 
protection under the few cases of non-partisan minister (14 country years) is a 
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large outlier: 1.58 % above the country-means. Of course, these figures are 
simple period averages which do not take into account the effect of controls, 
nor do they reveal much about the statistical significance between the group 
differences. 
Figure 2. Demeaned spending shares under different constellations of ministerial alignment (% of total government spending) 
 *Outsized column (1.58%), not fully shown to preserve the axis scale. 
I thus proceed to estimate the econometric models. As a first step, I fit a baseline 
model – results shown on Table 2 – that regresses spending shares on country-
fixed effects and the department-specific alignment variables. Coefficients for 
fixed effects and the 6th category of missing ministerial portfolio are suppressed 
from the table to ease readability in this and all subsequent models. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* 
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Table 2. Coefficient estimates from the baseline SUR-model Dependent Variable                (% of total budget) 
Defence Public Order and Safety Economic affairs Education Health Social Protection 
PM-alignment -0.173 0.234 0.051 0.237 0.423 0.214  (1.72)* (3.55)*** (0.14) (1.82)* (2.20)** (0.71) FM-alignment -0.183 0.229 0.375 -0.099 0.324 -0.523  (1.50) (2.67)*** (0.94) (0.66) (1.33) (1.42) Full-alignment 0.189 0.118 0.169 0.070 0.164 -0.073  (2.33)** (1.95)* (0.50) (0.75) (1.05) (0.32) Non-partisan -0.307 0.125 -0.068 0.078 -0.267 0.953  (2.21)**  (1.19) (0.17) (0.47) (1.10) (1.74)*        2 0.93 0.87 0.56 0.90 0.85 0.86 
N 
 
Bresuch-
Pagan χ2  (p-value) 
644   644 644  525.05 (p<0.001) 
644 644 644   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
The model fits, captured by the R2s are very high with the economic affairs 
equation being somewhat of an exception. This exception is partly explained 
by the fact that large unmodelled one-off measures, such as bank bailouts or 
recapitalization of public enterprises, fall in this category. The Breusch-Pagan 
χ2 test for residual independence allows for an easy rejection of the 
independent errors null-hypothesis, providing a strong justification for the 
choice of SUR estimation. Indeed, the cross-equation correlation matrix (see 
Table A-3 in the Appendix) reveals some interesting patterns, such as the large 
negative correlation coefficient (-0.48) between the social protection and 
economic affairs equations, suggesting that the two spending shares respond 
to shocks in an opposite direction: when the share of social spending rises, 
spending on economic affairs tends to drop. 
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The main coefficients of interest are the alignment dummies (with the case of 
non-alignment as the reference category). With the exception of social 
protection, the other five equations provide evidence for the portfolio 
allocation approach. This is most visible in the area of public order and safety 
where all three alignment types are significantly associated with higher 
spending shares compared to the non-aligned setting (with the non-partisan 
country-years non-significantly different from the non-aligned setting). In the 
other spending areas, the evidence from the baseline model is weaker: for 
defence, only the fully aligned setting appears to significantly differ from the 
non-aligned one whereas for education and health, alignment with the prime 
minister only seems to be decisive. 
These initial patterns however need to be treated with caution as they do not 
take into account some of the structural and institutional drivers of spending 
outcomes. In the extended models, I thus include a first set of controls that 
relate to all spending shares as outlined in Table 1 above: growth, debt level 
and changes in the structural balance (fiscal constraint), trade (globalization), 
gdp per capita (Wagner’s law) Gallagher index of disproportionality 
(institutional constraint) and a dummy for election year to test for any 
department-specific effects of political budget cycles (see de Haan and Klomp 
2013 for a relatively recent review). 
In these extended models, the R2s edge up a bit and the Bresuch-Pagan χ2 
continues to provide strong evidence for cross-equation correlation of the 
errors. Of the control variables, the election dummy and trade penetration do 
not appear as significant predictors of spending composition. By contrast, with 
the caveats of possible endogeneity concerns in mind, higher growth appears 
systematically associated with higher spending shares for defence, public order 
and safety and education, and lower shares for economic affairs, health and 
social protection. The fiscal variables (debt levels and changes in the structural 
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budget balance) also appear to play an important role: higher debt levels act as 
a break on education and healthcare spending while social protection takes up 
a larger share of the total budget under a high debt burden. Likewise, when 
governments balance the books (increases in the structural balance), social 
protection is systematically protected at the expense of economic affairs and 
defence spending. Wagner’s law points towards increased social spending 
(both social protection and healthcare) with an increase in gdp per capita at the 
Table 3. Coefficient estimates from the extended SUR-models Dependent Variable                (% of total budget) 
Defence Public Order and Safety Economic affairs Education Health Social Protection 
PM-alignment 0.076 0.129 0.184 -0.019 0.229 -0.296  (0.75) (2.00)** (0.54) (0.16) (1.51) (1.05) FM-alignment -0.031 0.198 1.028 -0.057 0.330 -0.708  (0.26) (2.39)** (2.62)*** (0.41) (1.67)* (2.05)** Full-alignment 0.388 0.034 0.162 -0.084 0.251 0.238  (4.65)*** (0.55) (0.46) (0.99) (1.97)** (1.10) Non-partisan -0.173 0.125 0.068 -0.124 -0.046 0.547  (1.23) (1.23) (0.17) (0.81) (0.24) (0.94) growth 0.022 0.033 -0.064 0.034 -0.260 -0.117  (2.45)** (5.53)*** (1.89)* (3.52)*** (1.18) (4.28)*** trade 0.003 -0.000 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.005  (1.21) (0.24) (1.00) (3.90)*** (2.58)*** (0.73) debt 0.001 -0.007 -0.002 -0.021 -0.029 0.023  (0.42) (5.06)*** (0.26) (8.96)*** (9.01)*** (3.54)*** 
Δstructuralbalance -0.037 0.013 -0.152 -0.010 0.026 0.164  (2.08)** (1.04) (2.24)** (0.49) (0.92) (2.99)*** gdppercapita -0.047 0.010 -0.023 0.001 0.115 0.060  (9.81)*** (3.09)*** (1.24) (0.10) (15.30)*** (4.06)*** gallagher -0.002 -0.035 -0.041 0.006 0.026 0.011  (0.11) (3.01)*** (0.60) (0.32) (0.97) (0.20) election -0.037 0.043 -0.083 0.002 -0.005 0.072  (0.61) (1.06) (0.36) (0.04) (0.05) (0.39)   R2   0.94  0.90  0.57  0.93  0.92  0.90 
N 
 
Bresuch-Pagan χ2 (p-value) 
566 566 566  381.42 (p<0.001) 
566 566 566   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01  
expense of defence. Finally, less proportionate electoral systems (high scores 
on the Gallagher disproportionality index) seem to be associated with lower 
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spending on public order and safety, somewhat contrary to the pertinent 
literature (Milesi-Ferretti et al 2002; Chang 2008) to the extent that such 
spending is geographically targetable. 
Turning to the coefficients of interest, the overall evidence still provide 
evidence for the two hypotheses. The large and highly significant estimates for 
defence spending as well as health spending under periods of full alignment, 
public order and safety as well as economic affairs spending (the latter estimate 
is especially noteworthy for its size) in periods of PM- and FM-alignments all 
offer confirmatory evidence for the positive spending impact of ministerial 
alignment. The only “casualty” of the model extension is the education budget: 
with the introduction of the controls, no significant difference can be detected 
between the different alignment types. Also, again, social protection stands out 
as an exception: periods of FM-alignment here are characterized by a 
significantly lower share of spending compared to the country-specific means. 
Finally, Table 4 presents the last set of models that include further controls for 
department-specific variables: size of the military for defence spending, % of 
urban population for spending on public order and safety as well as economic 
affairs, a dummy variable for riots for public order and safety, young- and old-
age dependency rates for education- , healthcare- and social protection, life 
expectancy for healthcare and unemployment rate for social protection. Also, a 
partisan dummy variable (taking on value 1 under left-of-center formateur 
parties) is included for all the equations. 
As expected, a larger military in relation to the whole population is associated 
with a higher share of defence spending and a higher share of urban population 
is associated with more spending on public order and safety as well as 
economic services. A high old-age dependency ratio increases spending for 
healthcare and social protection but rather surprisingly, a high ratio of young-
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age dependency appears to be associated with lower share of education 
spending. Unsurprisingly, life expectancy is positively associated with 
healthcare spending, just as higher unemployment leads to a higher share of 
social protection spending in the overall budget. 
Table 4. 
Coefficient estimates from the fully-specified SUR-models Dependent Variable                (% of total budget) 
Defence Public Order and Safety Economic affairs Education Health Social Protection 
PM-alignment 0.106 0.087 0.154 0.015 0.198 -0.106  (1.05) (1.41) (0.40) (0.13) (1.39) (0.37) FM-alignment 0.018 0.142 1.014 -0.080 0.183 -0.885  (0.16) (1.76)* (2.40)** (0.58) (0.98) (2.54)** Full-alignment 0.391 0.015 0.410 -0.071 0.295 0.293  (4.61)*** (0.26) (1.04) (0.87) (2.48)** (1.35) Non-partisan -0.599 0.133 -0.763 -0.275 -0.715 -0.909  (1.00) (1.33) (0.86) (0.43) (1.58) (0.86) growth 0.016 0.041 -0.061 0.036 -0.003 -0.104  (1.87)* (7.09)*** (1.77)* (3.75)*** (0.19) (3.88)*** trade 0.003 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.011 0.006  (1.46) (0.06) (0.98) (3.67)*** (3.67)*** (0.95) debt -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 -0.021 -0.039 0.016  (0.33) (7.16)*** (0.46) (9.17)*** (12.36)*** (2.39)** 
Δstructuralbalance -0.032 0.008 -0.145 -0.021 0.010 0.141  (1.80)* (0.71) (2.10)** (1.10) (0.40) (2.61)*** gdppercapita -0.038 -0.003 -0.046 -0.013 0.044 0.042  (7.49)*** (0.95) (2.28)** (2.16)** (3.83)*** (2.66)*** gallagher -0.002 -0.031 -0.030 0.004 0.034 0.000  (0.11) (2.78)*** (0.44) (0.20) (1.35) (0.00) election -0.043 0.021 -0.107 0.006 0.011 0.030  (0.74) (0.55) (0.47) (0.09) (0.13) (0.17) Left 0.050 -0.035 -0.074 0.082 -0.317 -0.424  (0.77) (0.87) (0.29) (1.32) (3.47)*** (2.61)*** armedforces  0.428 (4.88)***      riot  0.072       (1.24)     urbanpop  0.104 0.195      (7.40)*** (2.92)***    dependency_young    -0.093       (4.62)***   dependency_old     0.155 0.111      (4.77)*** (2.04)** lifexp     0.363       (5.32)***  unemployment      0.050       (2.54)**        R2 0.94 0.91 0.56 0.93 0.93 0.90 
N 
 
Bresuch-Pagan χ2 (p-value) 
561 561 561  335.76 (p<0.001) 
561 561 561   * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
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Most importantly, however, the overall pattern conveyed by the ministerial 
alignment estimates remains largely intact compared to the models with a more 
limited set of controls. Most importantly, the large and significant positive 
estimates for full alignment still hold for the defence and the health budget, 
while the public order budget and the economic budget rise above their 
country-specific means only in periods of FM-alignment. The only 
countervailing is, again, the large drop in the share of social protection 
spending in years of FM-alignment. 
 
Robustness and Extensions 
In addition to the stepwise inclusion of the groups of controls outlined above, 
I first re-estimate the models with a more conventional panel specification that 
treats the equations as independent from each other. The fixed effects OLS 
estimates with panel corrected standard errors are shown in the Appendix 
(Table A4). While some of the estimates’ size now change (for example, the 
large estimate for the share of economic spending in periods of FM-alignment 
is now somewhat smaller), the qualitative picture remains the same. The 
defence budget and the health budget provide strong support for both 
hypotheses, while the models on spending on public order and safety as well 
as economic affairs offer somewhat weaker evidence in favour of the second 
hypotheses on the role of the Finance Minister. The model for education 
spending still provides no support for either of the hypotheses and the model 
for social protection still stands out for the reverse impact of FM-alignment. 
Secondly, I return to the original model specification by zooming in the two 
largest and at the same time two most problematic budgetary categories: 
healthcare and social protection. Unlike the other four categories where the 
bulk of spending takes the form of discretionary spending, these two budgetary 
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items include a large number of entitlement programs with multi-annual 
legislative (and quite often constitutional) safeguards. In addition to the 
structural drivers specified by the SUR-models, as a result of these safeguards 
these two spending items often display long-term trends unaccounted for by 
the previous estimates. In fact, a simple regression of these two budget shares 
on a uniform sample-wide trend predicts that the budgetary share of healthcare 
and social protection increases by 0.12% and 0.18%, respectively, on an average 
annual basis. 
Table 5. Coefficient estimates from the detrended models for healthcare and social protection spending Dependent Variable                (% of total budget) Healthshare (residuals) Socialshare (residuals) PM-alignment 0.015 -0.016  (0.15) (0.09) FM-alignment 0.147 -0.083  (1.08) (0.35) Full-alignment 0.169 0.285  (2.17)** (2.08)** Non-partisan 0.122 0.069  (0.91) (0.17) Constant -0.088 -0.123  (1.46) (1.14)  R2 0.01 0.01 
N 
 
Bresuch-Pagan χ2  (p-value) 
590  2.902 (0.08) 
590  
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
To circumvent the potential problems that the omitted trend variable may 
entail, I first reran the SUR models without the ministerial alignment dummies 
but adding country-specific trends via a set of interaction variables between the 
country-specific fixed effects and the trend variable. The residuals from these 
auxiliary regressions can thus be used as proxies for the discretionary part of 
the respective spending categories that are not explained neither by the 
underlying drivers specified in the models nor by the country-specific trends. 
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As a second step, I thus regressed these residuals via another set of SURs on 
the ministerial dummies only. These estimates are shown below on Table 5. 
Reassuringly, the coefficients for ministerial-alignment in the healthcare sector 
in these detrended models behave similarly to the main estimates presented 
earlier. The marginal effect of full ministerial alignment (full-alignment 
dummy) is now somewhat smaller (0.17%) than in the previous models though 
it still safely passes conventional significance thresholds (p=0.03). More 
importantly, when the country-specific trends are accounted for, the model for 
social protection now provide evidence for our hypotheses: similar to the 
health budget, in years of full party-political alignment between the PM, the 
FM and the minister of social affairs, the share of social protection is almost 
0.3% (p=0.037) larger than in years without any ministerial alignment. 
As a final extension, I use a similar identification strategy to illustrate the 
impact of ministerial alignment in selected country-cases. First, I rerun the 
SUR-models with the structural, institutional and political drivers as well as 
country-specific trends but omitting the ministerial alignment dummies. The 
residuals from these regressions now include the impact of the ministerial 
alignment dummies as well as other omitted variables (and white noise). 
Second, I identify years where the residuals are more than 5% below and more 
than 5% above the predicted values as proxies for large positive and negative 
spending shocks (discretionary measures). Third, I identify periods where at 
least 2 years of negative (positive) shocks are followed by at least 2 years of 
positive (negative) shocks and check if these periods correspond to changes in 
government and/or ministerial alignments that are consistent with the 
empirical results. Overall, I was able to identify 6 such periods that Figure 3 
illustrates below. On the chart, the x-axis covers the years 3 years before and 3 
years after the year of government change. The data points correspond to the 
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regression residuals from the SUR-model without the inclusion of the 
ministerial alignment dummies. 
Figure 3. Evolution of the structural (and detrended) model residuals before and after changes in government in selected episodes (% of total budget) 
  
 
Ɨ year of government change  
For illustrative purposes, the changes in defense spending in Bulgaria between 
2006 and 2013 are especially noteworthy. Between 2005 and 2009, the 
constellation of the relevant ministries was a paradigmatic example of a non-
aligned setting. Under the leadership of Sergei Stanishev from the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party, the Finance Ministry was headed by the non-partisan Plamen 
Oresharski and the Ministry of Defence was first led by Vesselin Bliznakov then 
by Nikolai Tsonev, both from the coalition partner NDSV, the party of the ex-
tsar Simeon II. The 2009 election, however, gave way to a significant overhaul 
of Bulgarian party politics with the right-wing GERB led by Boyko Borissov 
becoming the strongest party on the Bulgarian party scene with close to 40% of 
the vote (Parlgov 2016). As a result of this landslide victory GERB formed a 
single-party government with all spending ministries under its control. In 
parallel with the political swing in party politics, the share of resources 
Ɨ 
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accruing to the defence budget also changed significantly: while between 2009 
it stood around 1% lower than would be predicted by the SUR models with the 
structural, institutional and political drivers, it shot above the predicted value 
following the year of the 2009 elections and stayed slightly above its predicted 
level thereafter. 
While in the Bulgarian episode a coalition government gave way to a single-
party one, the Irish 2011 election brought to power a coalition government 
between Fine Gael and Labour, led by Enda Kenny, replacing the Fianna Fail-
Progressive Democrats Coalition of Brian Cowen as Prime Minister. The 
change in government took place in the aftermath of the Irish banking crisis 
and the 2010 IMF intervention mandating severe cuts in the public budget. I 
focus here on the health budget for two reasons. First, as a budgetary category 
typically dominated by entitlement spending (health insurance), it is a hard test 
for the theory. Second, the ministerial alignment between the minister of health 
and the PM/FM also changed with the change in leadership. Whereas in the 
pre-2011 FF government, the ministry was headed by Mary Harney, delegated 
by the Progressive Democrats, FF’s junior coalition partner, in the post-bailout 
episode both the health ministry and the finance ministry (as well as the Prime 
Minister position itself) was occupied by Fine Gael politicians. Importantly, 
James Reilly, who headed the health ministry after 2011 was a prominent 
partisan figure in FG, acting as deputy party leader since 2010 (Wikipedia, 
2017). Correspondingly, in the midst of severe cuts in the overall budget, the 
relative share of healthcare spending edged up relative to what would be 
predicted by the structural model (including the trend variable) on healthcare 
spending. The swing between t-1 (a year before government change) and t+1 (a 
year after the government change) amounts to a full 8 % of total spending. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In the labyrinth of spending shares and different constellations of ministerial 
alignments, it is inherently difficult to disentangle a neat story that is consistent 
across countries, time and types of budgetary items. The aim I set out in the 
beginning of this paper is to find some commonalities in the underlying intra-
governmental logic that drives public spending composition. By restricting the 
analysis to within-country changes and controlling for a multitude of 
exogenous forces that impact on public spending composition, I offered two   
hypotheses on such logic: one derived from the portfolio allocation approach 
in the coalition formation literature emphasizing the role of formateur parties 
and therefore the Prime Minister, the other inspired by the common pool 
resource approach in public budgeting putting the Finance Minister in the 
centre-stage. The overall weight of evidence, as summarized on Figure 4, 
provides more support for the second perspective: alignment with the PM’s 
party alone is rarely a strong predictor of budget outcomes; ministerial 
alignment with the FM (and in some cases both the PM and the FM), however, 
tend to be associated with higher spending shares in the respective budget 
items. 
Beyond the statistical significance found for some of these effects that are 
marked on Figure 4, the substantive point estimates are also noteworthy. In the 
area of defence, for example, the fact that in periods of full ministerial-
alignment the expected spending share is almost 0.4% above periods of non-
alignment when holding other drivers of defence spending constant, is 
especially noteworthy given that this type of spending is typically a relatively 
small component of the total budget (3.5% in the sample average). The 1% 
positive impact estimated for periods of FM-alignment in economic services 
also stands out both in absolute number and in relative terms to the average 
budget share for economic services (11.4% in the sample). 
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Figure 4. Summary of coefficient estimates from the fully specified SUR models (Partial effect of ministerial alignment compared to the reference category of no alignment, % of spending share in total budget) 
 * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01    
Ɨ Estimates are used from the detrended models 
 
Two limitations of these findings, however, merit further analysis. One 
concerns the specific causal mechanism that connects ministerial alignment 
with budget outcomes. In the simplest formulation of the portfolio allocation 
approach, coalition partners arrive to the negotiation table with fixed 
preferences on portfolio salience and spending priorities and bargain for 
portfolio positions that maximize their potential to act upon those preferences. 
Our empirical findings, however, leave open an important question in the 
underlying causal mechanism: do the spending outcomes merely reflect these 
underlying preferences, or in other words, do higher/lower spending shares 
under ministerial alignment/non-alignment simply suggest that formateur 
parties succeeded/failed to succeed in obtaining ministerial portfolios that they 
wanted to flood with resources in the first place? Or alternatively, are spending 
share differentials testimony to ministerial autonomy in the strict sense of the 
word, whereby appointed ministers are more successful in ensuring higher 
funding for their departments when their co-partisans occupy one or both of 
Ɨ Ɨ 
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the two most important budgetary positions? Though the empirical patterns 
shown by this paper are interesting in their own right, one needs to understand 
them with a certain dose of agnosticism with regards to the specifying 
underlying causal mechanism. 
The second limitation of our findings concerns the different patterns across 
budgetary items. While in some categories (defence and health and in the 
detrended models, social protection), full ministerial alignment – i.e. PM, FM 
and SM being all delegated by the same formateur party – appears to have the 
greatest impact, in others (public order and safety and economic services) party 
alignment with the finance minister seems to matter the most. More 
problematically, in the domain of education no group differences were found 
and the results in the domain of social protection only corroborate the 
hypothesis when country-specific trends are explicitly modelled. At this point, 
no definitive answer can be provided for the reasons for such differences. An 
important next step in this research agenda would be understanding the 
department-specific dynamics that lead to these divergent trajectories. 
Finally, these findings raise an important question for institutional design. 
While the case for independent central banks have been widely established 
both theoretically and empirically (Barro and Gordon, 1983, Franzese, 2002:4), 
only relatively recently has the idea of non-political appointments as Finance 
Ministers gained intellectual currency. Apart from the general fears of 
budgetary overruns and deficit biases under highly politicized Finance 
Ministers, our findings point to an additional risk of partisan appointments. 
Even if the overall fiscal regime is highly conservative and constrained by rules 
and budgetary institutions, large relative spending shifts between spending 
departments in response to changing ministerial alignments may be equally 
problematic. If party-political favoritism rather than the long-term exigencies 
of the national economy is the key determining factor in resource allocation, it 
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raises awkward questions about the very quality of democratic responsiveness 
and representation.  
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Countries and years in the data sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Time-frame
Australia 1998-2014
Austria 1995-2015
Belgium 1995-2014
Bulgaria 1998-2014
Cyprus 2001-2014
Czech Republic 1995-2015
Denmark 1995-2015
Estonia 1995-2015
Finland 1990-2015
France 1995-2015
Germany 1995-2014
Greece 1995-2015
Hungary 1995-2014
Iceland 1998-2015
Ireland 1995-2014
Israel 1995-2015
Italy 1995-2015
Latvia 1995-2015
Lithuania 1995-2015
Luxembourg 1995-2015
Malta 1995-2015
Netherlands 1995-2015
Norway 1995-2015
Poland 2002-2015
Portugal 1995-2014
Romania 1995-2014
Slovakia 1995-2014
Slovenia 1999-2014
Spain 1995-2014
Sweden 1995-2015
Switzerland 1990-2014
UK 1995-2015
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Table A2.  Frequency distribution of ministerial alignment types in the sample (number of country-years) 
 
 
 
Table A3.  Correlation matrix of the equation residuals from the SUR models 
 
 
 
 
Defence 
Minister
Interior 
Minister
Economic 
Minister
Education 
Minister
Health 
Minister
Minister for 
social affairs
Non-alignment 200 171 197 171 180 207
PM-alignment 107 115 72 92 111 122
FM-alignment 59 68 40 78 46 48
Full-alignment 337 373 171 334 288 334
Non-partisan minister 32 34 47 37 38 24
No relevant ministry 26 0 234 49 98 26
Defence Public order and safety
Economic 
services Education Health
Social 
protection
Defence 1
Public order and safety -0.06 1
Economic services 0.02 -0.05 1
Education 0.08 0.21 -0.32 1
Health -0.3 0.24 -0.3 0.24 1
Social protection -0.32 -0.8 -0.48 0.01 0.12 1
Baseline Model
Defence Public order and safety
Economic 
services Education Health
Social 
protection
Defence 1
Public order and safety -0.05 1
Economic services -0.09 -0.05 1
Education 0.06 0.04 -0.41 1
Health -0.1 0.29 -0.3 0.16 1
Social protection -0.21 -0.03 -0.45 0.11 -0.02 1
Extended Model
Defence Public order and safety
Economic 
services Education Health
Social 
protection
Defence 1
Public order and safety 0.03 1
Economic services -0.09 -0.05 1
Education 0.1 0.04 -0.4 1
Health -0.04 0.19 -0.32 0.22 1
Social protection -0.14 -0.07 -0.43 0.08 -0.1 1
Fully specified Model
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Table 4A. Regression output table from OLS panel estimatesƗ   Defence Public Order and Safety Economic affairs Education Health Social Protection PM-alignment 0.110 0.059 0.447 -0.038 0.373 -0.320  (1.21) (1.10) (0.92) (0.26) (2.42)** (1.14) FM-alignment 0.069 0.157 0.608 0.124 0.346 -0.857  (0.81) (2.24)** (1.73)* (0.78) (1.61) (2.29)** Full-alignment 0.427 -0.012 -0.345 -0.055 0.419 0.349  (5.46)*** (0.21) (0.76) (0.60) (3.12)*** (1.20) Non-partisan -0.136 0.134 -0.128 -0.190 -0.073 0.442  (0.83) (1.75)* (0.27) (1.38) (0.49) (1.17) growth 0.022 0.038 -0.066 0.034 -0.009 -0.108  (1.82)* (5.15)*** (1.52) (2.12)** (0.51) (3.10)*** trade 0.002 0.000 -0.008 0.008 -0.011 0.005  (1.79)* (0.11) (1.00) (3.16)*** (4.04)*** (0.93) debt 0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.021 -0.040 0.013  (0.39) (7.56)*** (0.13) (7.55)*** (9.51)*** (1.78)* 
Δstructuralbalance -0.037 0.009 -0.148 -0.007 0.011 0.143  (1.88)* (0.83) (1.72)* (0.33) (0.34) (2.74)*** gdppercapita -0.047 -0.006 -0.023 -0.015 0.056 0.035  (16.89)*** (2.36)** (1.15) (3.24)*** (4.99)*** (2.36)** gallagher -0.002 -0.029 -0.058 0.009 0.031 0.004  (0.12) (3.21)*** (0.90) (0.43) (1.17) (0.09) election -0.035 0.027 -0.081 0.010 0.007 0.010  (0.67) (0.84) (0.34) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) riot  0.060       (1.08)     urbanpop  0.123 0.019      (14.83)*** (0.36)    dependency_young    -0.110       (3.66)***   dependency_old     0.215 0.195      (5.48)*** (4.29)*** lifexp     0.237       (2.68)***  unemployment      0.080       (2.86)*** 
R2 0.94 0.91 0.57 0.93 0.93 0.90 
N 566 566 566 566 566 563 
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
Ɨ fixed effects with panel-corrected standard errors   
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